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A Gulf Unites Us: The Vietnamese 
Americans of Black New Orleans East
Eric Tang
King’s Meat Market and Grocery sits on the northern end of the Broad Street bridge in the midcity section of New Orleans. When storeowner Mike Tran returned to King’s six weeks after Hurricane Katrina, he 
found only a shell of what once was. In addition to being flooded, the store 
had been broken into and his entire stock of nonperishable goods stolen, along 
with some cash and office equipment. Meanwhile the stench of rotten meat 
choked the air for blocks. “I just cried,” said Tran, who had built the business 
from scratch. At thirty-two, he is the youngest child of Vietnamese American 
refugees who resettled to New Orleans after the U.S. war in Vietnam.1
On the opposite end of the bridge sits Orleans Parish Prison (OPP). 
Here, more than 1,200 prisoners, the overwhelming majority black men, 
were stranded as the hurricane tore through the city and as the floodwaters 
steadily rose. These prisoners were abandoned without food, water, or proper 
ventilation. Two days passed before any of the prisoners were evacuated. By 
then, the waters in some of the cells had reached chest level. Several died as 
a result of the unbearable conditions. “They were screaming for their lives,” 
one witness testified.2 Among those eventually evacuated, some were taken to 
the bridge, where heavily armed Louisiana state troopers detained them. As 
it happened, this was not the only bridge in New Orleans where blacks were 
being held at gunpoint. On the Mississippi bridge, a throng of mostly black 
residents attempted to escape the rising waters in New Orleans by crossing 
westward into Gretna, a majority white township that had not been severely 
flooded. But the group of evacuees would never make it across. Gretna police 
were ordered to push them back. Some officers fired shots into the crowd in 
an attempt to turn it around.3
Aerial news images of people of color corralled on the bridges of New 
Orleans offered a stunning tableau of black suffering at the hands of white 
institutional power. The point was not lost on Tran, who, though having 
lived his entire life in New Orleans, had never witnessed this level of racial 
terror against blacks. “I was shocked by some of the things I saw happening 
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to blacks,” Tran said. “Katrina hit everyone; everyone was impacted. But some 
black folks were just left out there to die. ‘This was not the New Orleans I 
know,’ I said to myself.” 
Yet at the same time Tran is not naive about the way in which race permeates 
virtually all aspects of social life in New Orleans, particularly when it comes 
to community segregation. Tran was only ten months old when his parents 
resettled to what would eventually become the heart of the city’s Vietnamese 
American community, a neighborhood known as Versailles, located in New Or-
leans East. New Orleans East stretches as far as twenty miles east of downtown, 
and Versailles is situated on its eastern-most edge, along a waterway known 
as Chef Menteur Pass. The neighborhood’s official name is Village d’Lest, but 
it was dubbed Versailles because when the first wave of refugees arrived, they 
were placed into the Versailles Arms Apartments—a complex of low-income 
units that served as gateway homes for refugees. 
When Vietnamese Americans first arrived in Versailles, the neighborhood 
was approximately 90 percent black, a demographic that is attributed to several 
events, beginning with urban renewal efforts that pushed many blacks out of 
the downtown and uptown sections of the city during the postwar years.4 This 
was followed by the construction of new and relatively affordable housing in 
New Orleans East during the 1960s and 1970s that pulled many first-time 
black homeowners to the area. Not incidentally, during this same period of 
time, New Orleans East would see a steady pattern of white flight. Whites had 
originally moved east to enjoy the new housing stock and to escape downtown 
density. But before long they would have their sights set on even newer and 
certainly whiter subdivisions in neighboring Jefferson Parish. Contributing to 
white flight was the closure of some industries that had originally drawn white 
workers to New Orleans East. In particular, the closing of the NASA plant 
led to the departure of white workers who had once occupied the Versailles 
Arms Apartment complex.5 Those apartments remained vacant until they were 
redesignated section-eight housing. As working-poor and welfare-dependent 
black families moved into those units, white flight from the neighborhood 
only accelerated. 
By the late 1970s, Vietnamese Americans essentially became the lone racial 
minority in what was a decidedly black New Orleans East. “Growing up out 
East, all I knew was Viets and blacks,” Tran said. A lifetime of socialization 
in this racial context may explain why Tran defied the stereotypical reactions 
of an immigrant storeowner whose business had been looted, ostensibly by 
black residents. He exudes a deep ambivalence when asked about those who 
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apparently stole from him. “Cash, liquor, and cigarettes—yeah, they stole 
everything,” he said, appearing visibly annoyed. “But, you know, not everyone 
was there to steal. Some people were just finding a way to survive.” 
Proudly, Tran points out that his store must have served as shelter for those 
who were stranded. It was built on an elevated slab, which meant that it took 
some time before the waters rose high enough to flood the property. Moreover, 
he recalls finding large pieces of cardboard scattered across the floor. These 
were no doubt used as makeshift sleeping mats. Pieces of clothing and other 
personal effects were also left behind. 
Tran’s empathy for those stranded in his store may come across as unex-
pected, even anomalous. And yet it reflects a broader disposition among the 
Vietnamese American community of New Orleans East in the months following 
the great storm. This was a period marked not only by their remarkable rate 
of return, but also by the acts of solidarity and sharing between Vietnamese 
American and black neighbors. In the weeks following the storm, representatives 
from both communities would support each other on the political front, as 
each demanded greater state accountability, as well as with concrete resources 
such as meeting space for political and religious congregation. 
In the wake of a catastrophe such as Katrina, such acts of solidarity should 
not be entirely surprising; it should make sense that neighbors who are com-
monly afflicted by tragedy engage in mutual support. Yet what transpired 
between black and Vietnamese Americans stood out for several interrelated 
reasons, beginning with the way in which Asian Americans have historically 
been enlisted to delegitimize black claims for justice in the aftermath of racial 
crises. Whether it was the wave of urban unrest of the late 1960s or the con-
flagration of Los Angeles in 1992 following the Rodney King verdict, Asian 
American “successes,” specifically those achieved without (or even despite) 
state intervention, have served white racial dominance as an important coun-
tervailing argument against those who would hold the state accountable for 
the reproduction of racial inequality. 
According to Glenn Omatsu, the inextricable linkage between model minor-
ity tropes and Asian Americans has intensified over the past thirty-five years, 
owing largely to ways in which such racialization has enabled the political right 
to radically redefine civil rights in America.6 By championing Asian American 
successes in education and business in particular, neoconservatives from the 
Reagan era on have sought to reframe civil rights as the distinct right of in-
dividuals to have their successes protected against government intervention. 
Asian Americans have therefore been cast by neoconservatives as the victims 
|   120 American Quarterly
of affirmative action and racial quotas in higher education; meanwhile, their 
supposed penchant for creating economic opportunities amid postindustrial 
urban decline has served as condemnation of the social welfare programs em-
blematic of big government. 7
As the Vietnamese mounted their improbable return to New Orleans East—
the first in the area to do so without significant government assistance—the 
conditions seemed ripe for the reproduction of racial discourses that underscore 
Asian American self-reliance in distinction to black government-dependency. 
Moreover, that Vietnamese Americans are perceived to be an intractably conser-
vative ethnic group—due in large part to the anticommunist views of the gen-
eration that resettled to the United States following the fall of Saigon—should 
have driven an even bigger wedge between them and their black neighbors. 
But in the wake of Katrina, the Vietnamese American community revealed 
a radically alternative political sensibility. They demanded greater account-
ability from local and federal officials, who were slow with providing recovery 
resources. They engaged in bold direct actions, including civil disobedience, 
against state and private companies seeking to dump Katrina debris in their 
neighborhood. In the media, Vietnamese American leaders could be heard 
extolling grassroots efforts to defend New Orleans from developers and others 
who would profit from the disaster. And through it all, they allied with their 
black neighbors, who saw Katrina as nothing short of a referendum on race 
and class inequalities in the United States. 
This article analyzes the distinct political choices and nuanced racial position 
of the Vietnamese Americans of New Orleans East. In so doing, it uncovers 
the conditions of possibility that underlie racial solidarity, particularly those 
unexpected alliances that overcome prohibitive discursive and structural forces. 
I begin with a fuller description of the political activism and gestures of soli-
darity aforementioned. From here I explore two key factors that allowed for 
such activism and solidarity to take shape in post-Katrina New Orleans. First, 
both communities were buoyed by respective histories of resilience—”usable 
pasts” that community members summoned to explain their unlikely return 
and rebuilding efforts.8 Between Vietnamese American and black residents, 
these stories became mutually recognizable—or resonant—as each saw in the 
other motives for return that could not be reduced to economic concerns. 
Second, Vietnamese American and black residents of New Orleans East were 
not prone to the class antagonisms that are said to provoke the well-rehearsed 
black-Asian conflict in the postindustrial city: Vietnamese Americans are not 
overrepresented as small business owners who operate in poor black communi-
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ties without investing in those very communities, and black residents are not 
homogenously the working or jobless poor who are beholden to an interloping, 
nonblack entrepreneurial class. In New Orleans East, one finds class hetero-
geneity in both communities: each consists of the business owners, the home 
owners, the working poor, the welfare dependent, and the jobless. 
According to scholars from various fields of study, white racial dominance is 
invariably strengthened by the putative black-Asian conflict. This is true even 
when such conflicts seem to be rooted primarily in class opposition between 
Asians and blacks, and when whites appear absent from the scene. In fact, 
the seeming absence of whiteness from the conflict signals the very power of 
white racial dominance. As historian Vijay Prashad argues, the figure of the 
Asian merchant as perpetual stranger and irredeemable interloper in the black 
community (be it the South Asian merchant in East Africa or the Korean 
American shopkeeper in South Central Los Angeles) has historically served to 
reinforce white institutional power by concealing white imperial dominance 
over both communities: 
Those who shape and mainly benefit from the economic order appear exculpated from the 
systemic deprivation in this country: the white elites can be liberal because they do not have 
to be at the front lines of class struggle. For the working poor, the merchant appears to be 
the decisive exploiter and oppressor, while financial houses are protected by their spatial 
invisibility and by their crafty mechanisms that create economic distance. Because of this 
perverse logic, the oppressed in urban America seek to destroy the shops, if not in the name 
of white elites, then certainly not in opposition to them. And the idea of the “Korean,” 
forged in the smithy of U.S. imperial policies, becomes the determinate contradiction to 
black liberation.9 
Similarly, ethnic studies and literary scholar Elaine Kim recalls how this 
dynamic took shape when, in April 1992, black and Latino residents of Los 
Angeles took their outrage over police brutality to the streets, with many 
destroying property owned by those who they believed to be complicit with 
white institutional racism and black disempowerment. Included among these 
targets were hundreds of Korean American–owned businesses. Below, I will 
revisit the 1992 Los Angeles unrest in greater detail. Here, I want to highlight 
Kim’s observation of the way in which whites lorded over the conflict between 
black/brown residents and Korean American shopkeepers. She describes the 
rage she felt upon overhearing whites “discussing the conflicts as if they were 
watching a dogfight or a boxing match”;10 here, she likens whiteness to the 
polygamous patriarch who operates at a distance: “He can afford to be kind 
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and pleasant because the structure that pits his wives against each other is so 
firmly in place that he need never sully his hands or even raise his voice.” 11
For political scientist Claire Jean Kim, the puissant and unsullied position 
of whites in relation to the front-line race and class struggles in the contem-
porary U.S. city is the very ontology of whiteness. In the U.S. context, white 
racial dominance comes into existence wherever it situates itself in distinct 
relation to blacks and Asian Americans within a power-laden “racial field of 
position.” Kim describes this operation as “racial triangulation.”12 According 
to this theory, white racism sits at a specific coordinate or power from which 
it emanates two distinct yet complementary vectors. Moving in one direction, 
the first vector locates Asians Americans at a coordinate of unassimilability; here 
they are cast as “immutably foreign and unassimilable with whites on racial 
and/or cultural grounds in order to ostracize them from the body politic and 
civic membership,” according to Kim.13 From this coordinate, a second vector 
is released, one that valorizes Asian Americans over blacks, locating blacks at 
a third coordinate of inferiority to whites, as well as to other people of color. 
According to Kim, this schema serves as a corrective to theories suggesting 
that U.S. racial groups have been formed through distinct and independent 
trajectories, with Asian Americans serving as a buffer between prefigured 
black and white formations. Instead, according to racial triangulation, Asian 
American, black, and white positions are mutually constitutive—they remain 
in a constant process of informing one another. The devaluation of black life is 
therefore always substantiated in relation to Asian Americans. And the power 
of white racial dominance is determined by its ongoing ability to reproduce 
itself by maintaining positions of antagonism between racial others. 
In New Orleans East, where white residents are few and far between, racial 
triangulation may appear less obvious. But, here again, the invisibility of white 
racial dominance signals its potency. Though whites may not live in New 
Orleans East, white institutional power is felt everywhere. This point came 
into sharpest relief in the post-Katrina era. And yet the interactions between 
the Vietnamese Americans and blacks of New Orleans East remind us that 
racial triangulation is never a fait accompli. It can be stymied by historical 
trajectories and class positions that do not conform to triangular design. So, 
too, it can be challenged by the agency of racialized subjects whose complex 
daily relationships to one another exceed the binary of antagonism versus 
solidarity, thus neutralizing the interests and desires of whites who stand the 
most to gain from triangulation. 
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Model Minorities of a Different Sort
As a child of refugees, Tran is well versed in the history of his parents’ gen-
eration—those who rebuilt their lives after two decades of war in Vietnam. 
From an early age he learned that the reclamation of home—especially when 
achieved in solidarity with fellow displaced peoples—was a kind of success that 
trumped all others, including monetary success. So it came as no surprise to 
him that among the first community residents to return to New Orleans East 
in the weeks following Hurricane Katrina were the Vietnamese Americans of 
the area, led by the elderly residents who decades earlier had escaped the throes 
of the Vietnam wars.14 
The Vietnamese Americans first shocked the poststorm city when, in mid- 
October 2005—only a little more than a month after the flooding—a group 
of residents returned to their neighborhood in New Orleans East. In the fall 
of 2005, Versailles would be among of the first heavily impacted neighbor-
hoods in the city—and certainly the first in New Orleans East—to become 
functional after the storm. In early November 2005, its community leaders 
successfully pressured the city to turn on the utilities. By January 2006, even 
a few Vietnamese American small-business owners had returned; by spring of 
that year approximately 75 percent of their businesses were operational. But 
most impressive of all was the rate of residential return; approximately 1,500 
of the 5,000 residents had returned to Versailles by June 2006, and on the first 
anniversary of Katrina, the population stood at approximately 3,000.15 These 
were remarkable and unrivaled numbers, and yet they also posed a troubling 
racial disparity. Few could ignore that surrounding black neighborhoods in New 
Orleans East were still in ruins. The mere image of Vietnamese Americans bus-
ily rebuilding Versailles while other neighborhoods remained desolate had the 
potential of fomenting those axiomatic racial comparatives: Asian Americans 
were once again succeeding while neighboring blacks were faltering. 
But as it happened, such comparatives were not much in evidence. To the 
contrary, the Vietnamese Americans were lauded by neighboring black leaders 
who were impressed by the community’s activism and grateful for the way in 
which its leaders shared limited resources with black residents.
“After the storm, there was so much sharing from the Vietnamese Ameri-
cans, especially from Father Vien,” said Myron Angel, a longtime African 
American resident of New Orleans East who today sits on the Board of the 
Greater New Orleans East Neighborhood Association.16 Angel was referring 
to Father Nguyen The Vien, head of the Mary Queen of Vietnam Church 
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(MQVN). The priest was a well-known community leader prior to Katrina, 
but his stature only grew with his poststorm heroics. He was responsible for 
coordinating evacuation and rescue efforts as the floodwaters overwhelmed 
Versailles; then, a few weeks later, he led that first group of returnees back into 
the neighborhood, doing so over the objections of state and federal authorities. 
Black community leaders such as Angel expressed admiration for his pugnacity, 
but also for his deep compassion for his neighbors.17
“We had no place to meet, and Father Vien was the first person to open up 
his doors,” Angel said. Angel’s group had been granted unconditional access 
to MQVN church in the weeks and months following the storm. Completed 
in 1985, MQVN is the largest Vietnamese American Catholic church in the 
United States, a monument not only to refugee resettlement to New Orleans, 
but to the singular role of the Catholic church in engineering that process. In 
the months after Katrina, the church served as temporary shelter for the first 
wave of returnees, as the site for food and clothing donations, and as a clear-
inghouse for information on the whereabouts of missing family and friends. 
But it also became an important gathering point for black community leaders 
such as Angel, those whose churches and community centers had been all but 
destroyed. So, too, the MQVN would provide a temporary religious home 
for black parishioners. New Orleans East was without a Catholic mass for the 
first four months after the storm, a privation felt by black and Vietnamese 
Americans alike, as both communities maintain large Catholic majorities. 
In the first week of November 2005, Father Vien decided that his church 
was finally ready for services. One of his first steps was to reach out to black 
religious leaders, inviting their congregants to join what would be the area’s 
first post-Katrina mass. On that Sunday morning, the pews at MQVN, which 
hold approximately eight hundred, were completely filled. Those who attended 
the mass described it as something of a turning point moment for all of New 
Orleans East, signaling the inevitable return of the displaced. 
Angel recalls that prior to Katrina, the relationship between Vietnamese 
Americans and blacks could at best be described as “tolerant,” but certainly not 
allied. The genesis of this new sense of solidarity is something that he struggles 
to fully explain. “After a catastrophe, groups can become more insular, more 
defensive about protecting their community and businesses. But the Vietnamese 
folks did just the opposite.” 
The generosity exhibited by the Vietnamese Americans toward their neigh-
bors could be considered part of the many acts of grassroots solidarity shown 
between and among residents after the storm. Yet in the media, one also detected 
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a hint of model minority exceptionalism. According to several media reports, 
the speed and efficiency with which the Vietnamese Americans were able to 
return and rebuild had much to do with the fact that they had survived past 
traumas, particularly a history of war and displacement. Father Vien offered 
a more sobering explanation. “We were lucky,” he said. “Our church was not 
badly damaged and this allowed us to get back in to coordinate the return 
and rebuilding effort.”18 Without denying the importance of survival skills, 
the priest plainly recognized that his community did not sustain the degree of 
damage experienced in other neighborhoods, particularly in the predominantly 
black sections of New Orleans East—areas situated farther to the west, closer 
to the levees of the Intercoastal Waterway. He asserts that had the floodlines 
in Versailles reached only a few feet higher, the fate of his community could 
have been very different. 
And yet the relocation of the Vietnamese Americans along that eastern 
edge of New Orleans East was never a kismet matter. Thirty years earlier, the 
archdiocese of New Orleans, working through Catholic Charities, deliberately 
sought an underpopulated area of Orleans Parish in which to resettle the 
refugees. The quiet stretch along Chef Menteur Pass seemed ideal.19 The area 
is surrounded by wetlands (the less charitable description is swampland) and 
is located so far to the east that it is often jokingly referred to as “Mississippi.” 
Below I will explore the historical dynamics that led the archdiocese to resettle 
refugees to New Orleans in the first place. For now suffice it to say that the 
Catholic church has long played a central role in determining not only the 
geographic resettlement of the Vietnamese American community, but its po-
litical power as well. Indeed, the institutional backing of the archdiocese may 
serve to explain why leaders such as Father Vien were able to challenge city 
officials who discouraged his community’s precipitant return, or why he felt 
emboldened to excoriate foot-dragging federal officials slow to deliver on the 
temporary shelters. But the dominant role of Catholicism among the Vietnam-
ese Americans fails to explain several important post-Katrina developments, 
most notably the social justice—some might argue, left-leaning—activism that 
accompanied the community’s rebuilding process. 
“This is the first time I’ve seen a Vietnamese church practicing liberation 
theology,” remarked James Bui, gulf coast regional director of the National 
Association of Vietnamese Service Agencies (NAVASA).20 It is a radical desig-
nation that few would associate with Catholicism in New Orleans, which, as 
scholar Clyde Woods reminds, has often been on the wrong side of the city’s 
racial justice struggles.21 According to Woods, in New Orleans, the centuries-
|   126 American Quarterly
long struggle between black freedom and white racial dominance is no less 
the struggle between the blues tradition and Bourbonism, and the Catholic 
Church has often supported the agenda of the latter. Here, it may be overreach-
ing to suggest that in the aftermath of Katrina, Vietnamese Americans were 
summoning the blues. But they were certainly staking out a political pole that 
would take the city’s power structure by surprise while drawing them deeper 
into an alliance with the black community. 
The Landfill
Among the more subtle signs of Vietnamese American rootedness in Ver-
sailles are the luscious garden beds that float atop the wetlands surrounding 
the neighborhood. These gardens are meticulously tended each day by the 
neighborhood’s sixty- to ninety-year-olds, who were part of the first wave of 
refugees to resettle to the neighborhood.
In February 2006, no less than six months after Katrina ravaged those gar-
dens, they would come under threat again as a makeshift dump site, located 
only one-half mile from the center of Versailles, was opened under an executive 
order signed by Mayor C. Ray Nagin. The unlined landfill was created to hold 
more than a fourth of New Orleans’ Katrina debris. According to community 
members, most of what was being dumped was unsorted waste, and some 
feared that toxins were seeping into the wetlands. Community members, 
with the support of outside advocacy groups, were determined to shut it 
down. Leading the charge were the older members of the community. They 
took to city hall in the weeks following the opening of the landfill, staging a 
major protest that drew more than four hundred people. For all the reports of 
returnees scraping by without basic resources, the residents managed to arrive 
with printed signs and T-shirts denouncing the landfill. Nobody—neither the 
elected officials nor the protestors’ supporters outside—was prepared to see 
this level of organization. 
Faced with mounting pressure, Nagin promised to close the landfill by late 
August 2006, when its current permit expired. But as this date approached, he 
showed clear signs of pulling back on that promise. The mayor suggested the 
possibility of renewing the landfill permit because the Louisiana Department of 
Environmental Quality had recently stated its support for the continued use of 
the site. According to several Versailles residents I interviewed, this about-face 
was nothing short of a betrayal.22 Months earlier, their leaders had supported 
Nagin in his successful bid for reelection.
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On August 23, 2006, the day the landfill permit was set to expire (and only 
one week before the first anniversary of Katrina), community members took to 
the front lines of a demonstration at the site. For the previous two weeks they 
had been preparing for civil disobedience. Elderly residents and neighborhood 
youths stood shoulder to shoulder at the gates of the landfill, determined that 
no dump truck would pass. 
“This is either going to be a community celebration or a protest with people 
getting arrested,” said twenty-two-year-old Minh Nguyen, as he prepared to 
march on the landfill. “If no dump trucks appear, then it’s a sign that the permit 
was not renewed. But if the trucks do [arrive], then those of us blocking the 
entrance are going to get arrested.”23 Nguyen is the director of the Vietnamese 
American Young Leaders Association of New Orleans (VAYLA-NO), a group 
that organized a team of youth from Versailles to join the elderly residents for 
the action. Nguyen noted that no less than six months earlier, these youths 
were scattered to evacuation sites across the United States; now they were back 
home, poised to take their first political arrest. In the end, no dump trucks 
showed up. The mayor’s office sent word that the landfill site was officially 
closed. As the mostly Vietnamese American protestors celebrated at the shut-
tered gates of the landfill, they would be joined by black community leaders, 
most notably Councilwoman Cynthia Willard-Lewis. Lewis, who represents 
the Ninth Ward, stood before the crowd and praised them for bringing the 
“gift of unity and organization to New Orleans East,” for winning a “just and 
right fight . . . that strengthens and unites all of New Orleans.”24 
The activism demonstrated by the Vietnamese Americans of Versailles 
rendered model minority talk irrelevant, and yet as a result of their political 
efforts, a new kind of success story now seemed applicable. The struggle to 
close the landfill made headlines in the New York Times and other major print 
media.25 The TV news networks followed the story week to week, as well. As 
the public attention mounted, Versailles, hardly known as a hotbed of activ-
ism, had overnight become something of a beacon for a grassroots movement 
determined to assert the rights of Katrina returnees. Asian American com-
munity organizers, activists, filmmakers, students, attorneys, and academics 
traveled to New Orleans East to lend support to the rebuilding efforts and the 
landfill campaign. Among the city’s grassroots movements, the landfill closure 
was one of the few victories (and certainly the only one of its magnitude) in 
a year marked by unprecedented death and destruction, government neglect, 
and the rapid decline of the city’s black population. In light of all of this, it 
was important to the leadership of Versailles that the political win not be cast 
as an exclusively Vietnamese American success story. 
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“The landfill struggle, everything we’re fighting for out here—this is about 
the Vietnamese and the blacks together,” asserted James Bui of NAVASA. Bui 
was often responsible for fielding media questions about the landfill cam-
paign. He was cognizant of the way in which the social justice achievements 
of Vietnamese Americans, even when removed from the constraints of model 
minority typecasting, could be used by the media to yet again assert Vietnam-
ese American exceptionalism. In an attempt to correct those who would cast 
the landfill struggle as solely a “Vietnamese thing,” Bui made sure to point 
out the multiracial character of the effort. He noted that the campaign had 
gained momentum from the support it received from an umbrella organization 
known as Citizens for a Stronger New Orleans East, which consists of both 
Vietnamese American and black-led groups. Moreover, the venerated South-
ern Christian Leadership Council lent invaluable support to the Vietnamese 
American leadership in the weeks and months after the storm.
If racial triangulation is predicated upon the power of whiteness to valorize 
Asian Americans over blacks, then what becomes of it when—in a post-crisis 
instance such as Katrina—the common interests of Vietnamese American and 
black residents comes into sharp focus? Moreover, what becomes of triangula-
tion when Vietnamese Americans recognize the ways in which the historical 
struggles of blacks bear directly on their own fate? Leaders such as Father Vien 
and James Bui were candid about their community’s lack of experience with 
environmental justice issues prior to Katrina, suggesting that if it were not for 
the tutelage they received from environmental groups that for years had been 
organizing against dumping in neighboring black communities, the residents 
of Versailles might have acquiesced to the city’s use of the landfill site. Father 
Vien was initially compelled by the mayor’s argument that in order for New 
Orleans to fully recover, the hurricane debris had to go somewhere. Perhaps this 
was a sacrifice the Vietnamese Americans should make for the greater good. 
But local community activists quickly convinced the priest otherwise. They 
provided Vietnamese American community leaders with a crash course on 
the long-term effects of the toxins, helped them find experts to test the mate-
rial in the landfill (which revealed high levels of toxicity), and guided them 
through lengthy legal fights against the city and the Louisiana Department of 
Environmental Quality. 
Father Vien and other Vietnamese American community leaders would 
find ways to reciprocate. As the first anniversary of Katrina approached, the 
priest became a regular presence at meetings and events concerning the rights 
of displaced black residents. Offering the support of the people of Versailles, 
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he spoke at the rallies, town hall meetings, and community events put on by 
black coalitions seeking not only the right of return, but also the reopening of 
schools and public healthcare centers.
Finally, Vietnamese American leaders would have considered the landfill 
victory incomplete if it resulted in the resumption of dumping in another 
Hailnerable neighborhood. As it happened, this is precisely what the Loui-
siana Department of Environmental Quality and the Waste Management 
Corporation had in mind. They set their sights set on Waggaman, a multira-
cial, working-class town in Jefferson Parish. Although officials tried to assure 
Waggaman residents that any potential landfill site would be fully certified and 
properly lined, local resistance to their proposal began almost immediately. 
“I’m completely with them,” Father Vien said.26
That racial triangulation operates within a field of position suggests the 
implicit possibility of repositioning. Here, it helps to conceptualize positions in 
the Gramscian sense: specific coordinates that uphold a hegemonic form while 
simultaneously possessing the potential of that form’s undoing. With respect to 
triangulation, the inherent possibility of counterhegemony is evinced when a 
change in the position of one racial group consequently repositions the other 
two. If Vietnamese Americans choose to challenge discourses that valorize 
their efforts at the expense of blacks, such a move simultaneously alters the 
racial positions of blacks and whites within that field of power. However, the 
question remains, what are the conditions that give rise to these moments in 
which particular racial groups will break from hegemonic discourse?
In what follows, I argue that the exigency of crisis is not enough to set forth 
the conditions of possibility for lasting solidarity, nor can it support the sus-
tained articulation of cross-racial belonging in New Orleans East. In the years 
since the landfill struggle, political alliances between Vietnamese Americans 
and black residents have persisted through various channels. The two com-
munities worked closely together in influencing the so-called master plan for 
New Orleans, ensuring that the area be recognized as an important cultural 
heritage district. Young activists from both communities have also been jointly 
active in struggles to reopen area schools. Most important, both groups have 
avoided falling into competition with one another over scarce resources, even 
as government officials politicized the process of doling out recovery funds. 
These efforts defy political expediency and other ephemera. They are rooted 
in a mutual recognition of commonalities that run deeper than post-Katrina 
victimization. 
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On Resonant Histories of Resilience
“Before Katrina, the black and Vietnamese communities never had a chance 
to learn each other’s history,” said Ron Chisom, director of the People’s In-
stitute for Survival and Beyond, a grassroots organization dedicated to anti-
racist education.27 Since the mid-1960s, Chisom has been actively involved 
in the civil rights and Black Power movements, work that continues through 
the post-Katrina period. In 2007, the People’s Institute began coordinating 
regular meetings among a new and multiracial corps of community organiz-
ers that emerged in the post-Katrina era. Included among them were some of 
the young organizers from Versailles, those who were involved in the action 
against the landfill. The goal of the gatherings was simple enough: to deepen 
the connections between communities that first began to work with each after 
the storm. For Chisom, if such relationships were to continue in what some 
now termed the “post-post Katrina” era—when all the national attention was 
beginning to fade—then it was important that each community appreciate 
the specific historical struggles of the other.28 But Chisom concedes that even 
before this opportunity arose, there was something about the way in which 
the Vietnamese Americans had gone about their return and rebuilding process 
that immediately resonated with black residents of New Orleans, signaling to 
them that the two were potential allies, not competitors: 
What the Vietnamese were doing right after the storm made a lot of sense to black folks. 
[The Vietnamese] weren’t the developers, the opportunists, trying to grab up land after the 
disaster. It was clear to black people that they weren’t just in it for the money. They came 
back to rebuild a place that most people in New Orleans wanted to forget. Black folks 
understood that and they respected it.
His observation affirms what Vietnamese Americans believe about themselves: 
economic motives alone do not explain why so many insisted on returning and 
rebuilding. Many of those who first resettled in Versailles in the mid to late 
1970s have never moved on; it is the only U.S. home they have ever known. 
On the one hand, this could signal economic stagnation and the absence of 
opportunity: refugee job assistance programs failed or were dismantled prema-
turely, thus leading to unemployment and decades of welfare dependency that 
in turn limited the opportunities for residents to move outside of Versailles. 
Yet lack of growth and opportunity fails to explain why so many Vietnamese 
American residents decided to return after the storm.
The equal yet opposite economic theory suggest that the refugees have 
remained rooted in Versailles because they have somehow turned that original 
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resettlement neighborhood into a land of opportunity, developing a bustling 
“ethnic economy”—Vietnamese-owned groceries, restaurants, and small 
factories—that keep ethnic capital flowing in the area. The theory of the 
ethnic economies, as scripted by sociologists such as Alejandro Portes, Ivan 
Light, and Min Zhou, argues that by creating their own labor market match 
through self-capitalization and coethnic employment, new immigrant groups, 
particularly Asian immigrants, have built ethnic enterprises that have allowed 
them to avoid the poverty and underemployment experienced by nonimmi-
grant working-class groups during the postindustrial epoch.29 According to this 
theory, although exploitation and working poverty continue to exist within the 
ethnic economy (as ethnic owners will exploit “their own”), there nevertheless 
exists a strong degree of bounded solidarity among coethnics. Such solidarity 
keeps capital and labor flowing within the bounded ethnic community, and 
this accounts for the remarkable growth of Chinatowns and Little Saigons 
even in periods marked by urban decline and economic recession. The ethnic 
economy thus serves as the sociological adjunct to model minority discourses 
steeped in the perceived cultural values of Asian immigrants. However, upon 
closer examination, the theory of ethnic economies actually relies heavily on 
cultural explanations, especially when it attempts to explain why immigrants 
possess embedded solidarity and blacks do not. According to Alejandro Portes 
and Min Zhou, the answers are largely cultural. Unlike new immigrants, blacks 
have experienced the “thorough process of acculturation among U.S.-born 
members . . . [leading] to a gradual weakening of their sense of community and 
to a re-orientation towards their values, expectations, and preferences.”30 Here, 
the ideological underpinnings of racial triangulation are clearly evident. 
Still, in her own study of Versailles, titled Growing Up American: How Viet-
namese Children Adapt to Life in the United States (1998), co-written with Carl 
L. Bankston III, Zhou stops short of suggesting that the Vietnamese Ameri-
cans of New Orleans have developed a vertically integrated ethnic economy. 
Although Zhou and Bankston’s study analyzes the emergence of Vietnamese-
owned restaurants and shops in Versailles during the 1980s, these businesses 
never grew to the scale of an ethnic economy resembling the Little Saigons or 
Chinatowns of other major cities—economies that could offer employment 
opportunities to a large number of coethnic residents.31 Versailles represents 
no clear-cut economic model that might explain residents’ persistent attach-
ment to the area. 
Father Vien suggests turning to history for an answer. “If you want to know 
what drove our people back to New Orleans, you have to look at least fifty years 
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in the past, to the war before the war.” He is referring to the little known fact 
that those who first resettled in New Orleans in 1975 have shared a journey 
that dates back not only to the U.S. war in Vietnam, but to the anticolonial 
wars against the French In November 1954, French forces were decisively 
defeated by Ho Chi Minh’s revolutionary army in the northern province of 
Dien Bien Phu, bringing an end to more than a century of French colonialism 
in Vietnam. In the northern Vietnamese villages of Bui Chu and Phat Diem, 
located in the Red River delta, lived a concentration of devout Catholics who 
feared acts of reprisal against them by the revolutionaries, who were deeply 
suspicious of Catholicism’s role in bolstering French rule. Soon after the ouster 
of the French, Catholic leaders engineered a mass exodus of tens of thousands 
of parishioners to the southern Vietnamese villages of Haing Tau and Phuc 
Thinh, located southeast of Saigon, where for the time being revolutionary 
forces held little sway.32 
As these refugees from the north went about rebuilding their lives in south-
ern Vietnam, U.S. military forces began their build-up in the region as well. 
Determined to succeed where the French had failed, the United States officially 
invaded southern Vietnam in March 1965, taking control of the capital city 
of Saigon.33 The Catholic refugees could not have imagined that the outcome 
of this American phase of the war would result in their resettlement to New 
Orleans. A decade later, with the defeat and withdrawal of the U.S. military, 
followed by the collapse of the Republic of Vietnam in April 1975, they were 
once again on the run. This time, however, there would be no safe haven within 
Vietnam, as the communist victory was complete. 
They would become international refugees, scattered to refugee camps, 
including several emergency relocation centers in the United States: Camp 
Pendleton (California), Camp Chafee (Arkansas), Elgin Air Force Base (Flor-
ida), and Fort Indiantown Gap (Pennsylvania). Archbishop Philip Hannan, 
then head of the New Orleans archdiocese, was intrigued by the story of the 
devout Catholic refugees who had sojourned together since 1954. He visited 
Camp Chafee and Elgin Air Force Base, and extended an open invitation to the 
refugees to resettle in New Orleans. Not only was New Orleans a Catholic city, 
but it also possessed a tropical climate and seafaring opportunities for which 
the Vietnamese were well suited. In the decades following resettlement, the 
refugees would indeed find steady work as gulf coast shrimpers. They took well 
to the region’s climate, with many commenting that it often felt like home.34 
“For better or worse, New Orleans East is now their home,” Father Vien 
said. “This place gave them a chance to replant some old roots.” Having been 
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uprooted from home twice in the fifty years prior to Katrina, they would not 
so easily be removed a third time. According to Father Vien, the history of this 
community served as the driving force behind their improbable post-Katrina 
return. 
“Resilience” has emerged as the heuristic concept in several post-Katrina 
studies that seek to determine prospects for the city’s full recovery. Resilience 
analysis had been conducted with respect to the city’s built and natural en-
vironment,35 its ability to respond to future hazards,36 the mental health of 
hurricane survivors,37 and the socioeconomic characteristics of those who 
returned compared to those who did not.38 In particular, this last factor has 
been measured through several variables of social and economic capital: income, 
educational background, and homeownership rates. However, for the Vietnam-
ese Americans of Versailles, the shared experiences and collective memory of a 
community are no less vital in determining resilience. Such history functions as 
a form of social capital for the Vietnamese American community by expanding 
members’ capacity to engage in return and rebuilding efforts when other social 
and economic indicators suggest that return is improbable. This point is reiter-
ated by Karen Leong, Christopher A. Airriess, Wei Li, Angela Chia-Chen, and 
Verna M. Keith in their important essay, “Resilient History and Rebuilding of 
Community: The Vietnamese Americans of New Orleans East”: 
The Vietnamese American community in New Orleans East possesses social and cultural 
capital that is based on its members’ lived experience and historical memory. Because mi-
gration occurred within the past three generations and under the conditions of war, the 
community has sustained the strong social networks that operated during the refugee and 
migration experience as well as confidence in the efficacy of those networks.39
But if shared experience and collective memory serve as a particular asset to 
the Vietnamese American community, Leong and her coauthors are careful 
not to equate this with yet another form of racial exceptionalism. In other 
words, a resilient past does not set Vietnamese Americans apart from other 
racial groups, thus reinforcing the model minority trope. To the contrary, the 
authors observe how it encouraged Vietnamese Americans to engage in new 
forms of civic activism, including a burgeoning alliance with black neighbors. 
This point can be taken one step further. In addition to expanding political 
horizons, how might the community’s history also serve as the basis for mutual 
recognition across communities of color? Returning to Ron Chisom’s asser-
tion, how might historical particularity provide the necessary access points 
for a lasting solidarity?
|   134 American Quarterly
Racial and cultural particularity are the social facts of political solidarity. 
That is, racial groups rarely enter alliances with the goal of downplaying dif-
ference for the sake of a broader, abstract unity.40 Rather, they often approach 
alliances with an eye toward seeing in another some of their own particularity. 
If black leaders saw something laudable in the Vietnamese American return to 
Versailles, perhaps it was because they saw something of themselves in those 
efforts.
One of the least discussed post-Katrina phenomena was the remarkable 
number of black residents of New Orleans East and the greater Ninth Ward 
that eventually did return despite having sustained heavy property damage. 
Similar to their Vietnamese American neighbors, they returned when most 
social and economic indicators suggested they would not. And they would do 
so by drawing upon the black community’s own history of resilience. 
Rates of neighborhood return have been analyzed by the Greater New 
Orleans Data Center, which used postal data to determine which zip codes 
resumed mail delivery service in the years following Katrina. Among the areas 
that revealed the most impressive rate of return (relative to the damage sus-
tained) was zip code 70127, encompassing the West Lake Forest neighborhood 
in New Orleans East. West Lake Forest is located immediately to the west of 
Versailles, and its pre-Katrina black population stood at 85.6 percent. From 
August 2006 through December 2008, the recovery rate in this zip code was 
470.02 percent (the percentage gain in total number of households receiving 
mail during this interval).41 The significance of this percentage gain becomes 
clearer when compared to rates in whiter and more affluent neighborhoods 
that sustained equivalent damage. The recovery rate in Lakeview (zip code 
70124), for example, was 183.75 percent. According to 2000 census data, 
whites constituted 95.7 percent of the Lakeview population prior to the storm. 
Pre-Katrina, Lakeview residents had higher household incomes, twice the 
number of bachelor degrees, and a much higher percentage of homeownership 
rates than their counterparts in West Lake Forest.42 In other words, Lakeview 
residents were stronger across each of the key social and economic variables 
that were supposed to determine resilience. Nevertheless, the black residents 
of West Lake Forest demonstrated a stronger recovery rate. 
According to community leaders such as Myron Angel of the Greater New 
Orleans East Neighborhood Association, counterintuitive as it may seem, the 
low-income homeowners were more likely to return to their homes than their 
wealthier counterparts because they had fewer economic options; in particular, 
they were tied to big mortgages that continued to require payments despite 
| 135The Vietnamese Americans of Black New Orleans East
the catastrophe. But this argument is offset by another astounding statistic. 
According to a study conducted by sociologists James Eliot and Jeremy Pais 
of Tulane University, black residents of New Orleans were four times more 
likely than white counterparts to lose their jobs after the storm. When they 
re-analyzed the data to account for low-income black workers in particular— 
those who made from $10,000 to $20,000 annually—the figures revealed that 
blacks were seven times more likely to lose their pre-storm jobs. Still, many 
returned.43 
For black community leaders such as Ron Chisom, black returns were no 
less than a form of resistance politics that has long defined New Orleans. By 
returning and rebuilding without significant support from the state, and when 
most standard indicators suggested that returns were economically unviable, 
black residents were engaged in acts of racial self-making that can be traced 
to previous political moments. “People don’t realize that we had been here 
before,” Chisom said. “As catastrophes go, Katrina was perhaps the worst, but 
certainly not the first.” On August 27, 1965, forty years before Katrina made 
landfall, a category three storm named Hurricane Betsy tore though New 
Orleans. Betsy flooded the entire Ninth Ward, including New Orleans East. 
But the worst damage occurred in the Lower Ninth Ward, where floodwaters 
reached above ten feet. Those who remember Betsy often comment on how 
eerily it was mimicked by Katrina. As it was in 2004, the massive floods of 
1965 had less to do with the storm itself than with the breeching of inadequate 
levees, underscoring the extent to which the most severe losses were the result 
of government negligence. 
In the aftermath of Hurricane Betsy, community members would return 
and rebuild, and within a few years the area’s black home-ownership rates 
steadily increased and black businesses thrived again. These efforts would also 
take place within the context of an ongoing civil rights movement and its new 
engagements with Black Power ideologies.44 Within such a milieu, the call for 
black autonomy was consistent with the actions of residents who were returning 
and rebuilding without significant government support. Moreover, during this 
same period, the entire Ninth Ward would see a sharp increase in the black 
population, as white residents displaced by the storm decided not to return. 
As the area became blacker, city officials did increasingly less to support it with 
economic investment, public works, and the funding of public education.45 
This in turn resulted in two important political developments among the 
grassroots movements. First was the intensification of community organizing 
efforts demanding greater government accountability. The second was the 
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simultaneous, if paradoxical, deepening of black political autonomy in the 
form of community-run institutions that could meet immediate needs being 
ignored by the state. In addition to the well-known Survival Programs of the 
Black Panther Party, the Ninth Ward also saw the emergence of new arts pro-
grams and public health clinics that were autonomously run by local leaders. 
Kalamu ya Salaam, the renowned poet and revolutionary activist who helped 
pioneer the Black Arts Movement, participated in many of these efforts. In his 
view, black autonomy was a direct response to the state’s capacity for lawless-
ness toward black residents. In the aftermath of Betsy, it was rumored that 
the levees surrounding the Lower Ninth Ward had been secretly detonated 
during the storm. According to the conspiracy theory, the Ninth Ward was 
deliberately flooded to alleviate potential flooding in more privileged areas of 
the city. But in Kalamu’s view, conspiracy theories only obscure the fact that 
the state was more than willing to sacrifice and was capable of openly sacri-
ficing black lives on a daily basis: “I’m not a paid-up member of the Negro 
Conspiracy League. I don’t think we need conspiracies to explain just brutal 
class warfare,” he asserts. “The reason I caution against buying into conspiracy 
theory with Betsy is because even if the levees were blown, it was the power 
structure that did it. It wasn’t the Klan.”46 His caustic observation speaks to 
the importance of developing black resistance strategies that go beyond the 
call for state accountability.
In the post-Katrina era, this two-pronged political orientation has resurfaced, 
pointing to the way in which the shared experiences and collective memory 
derived from the post-Betsy years continue to inform black returnees today. 
According to sociologist Rachel Luft, several of the social justice groups that 
have been central to the post-Katrina rebuilding and accountability efforts 
have again developed a “strategic synthesis” of grassroots organizing and 
service provision.47 They have eschewed the notion that these two tactics can 
work only at cross purposes: that is, the assumption that direct services will 
only undermine organizing by alleviating the state and owning class of its 
responsibilities, while diverting the masses from direct confrontation with 
power. To the contrary, Luft notes how some of the most effective organizers 
in post Katrina New Orleans have used direct services as a vital “base-building 
strategy that could strengthen community, increase consciousness, and link 
needs to action.”48
Among the most salient examples of this is the collaboration between the 
New Orleans Women’s Health Clinic and the New Orleans Women’s Health 
Justice Initiative. The clinic delivers direct, low-to-no fee health care to low-
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income women of color who were disproportionately affected by the demise 
of the public health-care system after the storm. Simultaneously, the initiative 
works to organize those who rely on the clinic’s services, mobilizing them and 
community allies to bring public attention to a health-care crisis that existed 
long before the storm. The project has been lauded as a novel approach to 
organizing the most marginalized community members while meeting their 
most pressing needs. But according to Shana Griffin, director of the initiative, 
taking such an approach has largely been a matter of political common sense. 
When the state has clearly demonstrated its disregard for those who reside at the 
intersection of black, poor, and female, it would be irrational to limit political 
resistance to an appeal for greater state intervention. In a 2007 interview with 
Clyde Wood, Griffin elaborates on this point: “When you identify the state as 
the main orchestrator of violence in the lives of many communities, it’s hard to 
make appeals to the state to mitigate the violence the state is committing.”49
Here Griffin echoes the previous generation of activists who understood 
that a degree of political autonomy is necessary when faced with the state’s 
capacity for lawlessness. Moreover, she evokes a sorely overlooked fact about 
the black grassroots community in the post-Katrina era: its actions were never 
limited to issuing grievance and demands against the state—”waiting for the 
government to save them,” as some have criticized. Rather, it was deeply en-
gaged in the process of return and rebuilding as an act of racial self-making. In 
so doing, it could draw upon a rich political past to inform its understanding 
of resilience.
Usable pasts served as vital assets for both Vietnamese Americans and blacks 
respectively. Yet the question remains to what extent do resilient histories 
have the power to resonate across communities? Such resonance was evident 
in Chisom’s observation that the return and rebuilding efforts in Versailles 
simply “made sense” to black residents, even before they had a chance to fully 
understand the history of their neighbors. So, too, it was evident among black 
leaders outside of New Orleans East—those who were receiving only second-
hand reports of the developments in Versailles, yet nevertheless embraced 
the Vietnamese American recovery effort. In July 2006, I interviewed Norris 
Henderson, director of Safe Streets, Strong Communities, a New Orleans group 
that is leading efforts to reform the city’s dysfunctional prison and criminal 
justice system. I asked Henderson if, among those he worked with, he sensed 
any resentment of the Vietnamese Americans who were drawing the lion’s share 
of media attention on the eve of the first anniversary of Katrina.
“I don’t see any resentment of the Vietnamese coming from the black 
community or any other community,” Henderson replied. “What I see is an 
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example of what we all can do if we hang in there together.” Having served 
more than twenty-seven years in prison, Henderson knows perseverance when 
he sees it: “Most people don’t think you can win. They’re too quick to become 
defeatist. But [the Vietnamese Americans] had a common goal and they were 
persistent—they had what it took.”50
Finally, such resonance was evident among the Vietnamese American lead-
ership that often linked its accountability to a legacy of black activism. Father 
Vien’s efforts to build new alliances with black leaders in the months after the 
storm betray the fact that, pre-Katrina, he knew very little of the history of 
his black neighbors. Still, he knew enough to recognize that the Vietnamese 
Americans, in taking up the mantle of the area’s grassroots movement, were 
honoring a past that transcended its own. There was a political trajectory in 
New Orleans East that the priest and others around him felt accountable to, 
one that would bear influence on the political orientation of the Vietnamese 
Americans: 
Before Katrina, I guess you could call us libertarians. Our attitude toward government was: 
you don’t bother us, and we won’t bother you. But New Orleans East has a long history of 
fighting back. It was impossible for us to not speak up. We realized that if we speak, the 
powers will listen. They would have to heed the people’s voice. We had a responsibility to 
contribute, to push for government accountability.
By no means do the Vietnamese Americans and blacks of New Orleans East 
possess a shared history, but it is indeed a resonant one. And such resonance 
serves as a condition of possibility for pending political solidarity. Between 
Vietnamese Americans and blacks in particular, resonant histories also function 
as counterdiscourse, challenging the discursive power of racial triangulation 
that would seek to valorize the former over the latter in an effort to sustain 
white dominance. 
Of course, conditions of possibility are never limited to discourse. It remains 
that the power of racial triangulation registers at both the discursive and the 
structural levels. And between Asian Americans and blacks in particular, op-
positional class positions and labor market competition have largely defined 
their relationship in the contemporary city. These structural tensions reached 
a breaking point during the Los Angeles upheaval of April 1992, when thou-
sands of Korean American businesses were looted and destroyed following 
the infamous Rodney King verdict. The events in Los Angeles serve as the 
apotheosis of racial triangulation in the post-civil rights era. 
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“How Are We Supposed to Be?” 
Store owner Mike Tran was determined to rebuild, and rebuild he eventually 
did. Today, King’s Meat Market and Grocery is a bustling business again due in 
large part to the black customers who account for the overwhelming majority 
of the store’s income. This fact gives Tran pause when he reflects on the looting 
that took place nearly three years ago. “How can I sit here and say, ‘Hey, these 
people stole from me?’” Tran rhetorically asks. 
That Tran had the means to rebuild his business in less than two years 
raises important questions about the class privileges indelibly connected to 
the possibility of return. So, too, the impressive number of black returnees to 
New Orleans East signals the relative class privilege of black home owners in 
the area: though these home owners did not possess the social and economic 
capital found in whiter neighborhoods, they nevertheless possessed some means 
of return largely unavailable to those who remained displaced. If a usable past 
was available to all, then class privilege determined who might readily mo-
bilize that past in concrete ways. The forthcoming 2010 Census data should 
reveal what percentage of the returnees to New Orleans East are low-income 
residents, and whether or not that percentage matches pre-Katrina numbers. 
However, a before-and-after storm comparison of the total number of section-
eight housing units in New Orleans East indicates that the area has seen the 
steady return of low-income residents. According to the Housing Authority 
of New Orleans, nearly all the zip codes of New Orleans East now have more 
than twice the number of section eight units than they did before Katrina.51 
We do not know if these numbers include the very same tenants who occupied 
section eight housing in New Orleans East prior to Katrina. However, we do 
know that New Orleans East continues to maintain class heterogeneity. The 
post-Katrina return to New Orleans East has not been limited to middle-class 
home and business owners. 
For the thirty years prior to Katrina, the Vietnamese American and black 
communities of New Orleans East have each maintained a complex class mix 
consisting of home owners, small business owners, middle-income workers, 
low-income workers, the jobless poor, and the welfare dependent. No single 
economic class clearly dominates in either community, and as a result it is dif-
ficult to differentiate precise political orientations between and among both 
groups. The postindustrial city is defined by what are now familiar race/class 
archetypes—immigrant shopkeepers, underemployed black youth, overworked 
immigrant sweatshop laborers, women of color in the welfare state—each cor-
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relates with the other as a coherent picture of a contemporary city emerges. 
But in New Orleans, such correlations are not so easily made. 
During one of our conversations, Tran seemed bewildered by my own sense 
of bewilderment over the myriad race and class positions to be found among 
Vietnamese and blacks in New Orleans East. He finally had to ask me: “So 
how are we supposed to be?” 
I offered him my interpretation of narratives of conflict emerging from 
New York City and Los Angeles from the early 1980s through the 1990s. This 
conflict cast Asian American store owners, particularly Korean Americans, 
as those who freely set up shop in poor black neighborhoods, but refused to 
hire local residents or invest in those neighborhoods, and who often treated 
customers with rude indifference. Black customers were in turn portrayed as 
those who would sooner resent the hard-earned success of newcomers than 
engage themselves in an honest, entrepreneurial living. There were major 
flashpoints to the conflict: harassment and violence against Korean American 
store owners by black customers, shootings (at times fatal) of black customers 
by shopkeepers; the highly publicized black boycotts of Korean American–
owned groceries in New York City.
The crescendo was the Los Angeles unrest of April 1992, when the city 
burned following the acquittal of four Los Angeles police officers who were 
caught on tape brutally beating Rodney King, a twenty-five-year-old black 
man. As the mostly black and Latino insurrection took its anger to the streets, 
some would target Korean American–owned businesses under the pretense that 
they were accessories to white racial dominance over blacks. Others simply 
took advantage of the fact that the Los Angeles Police Department chose not 
to protect Koreatown during the upheaval. Approximately half of the 3,100 
Korean American–owned businesses in Los Angeles sustained damage, much 
of which was irreparable. Total losses neared $350 million. The mainstream 
media would offer lurid and deeply racialized accounts of looters amid an ur-
ban crisis. They were invariably portrayed as young, black, male, criminal, and 
dangerous: “thugs” was the preferred media shorthand.52 Meanwhile, Korean 
American merchants, even those who would arm themselves, were invariably 
cast as victims of wanton black violence. In the aftermath of the destruction, 
activist leaders from both the black and Korean American communities took 
pains to point out that divisions between them, largely exacerbated by corpo-
rate media reporting, worked to divert attention away from white institutional 
racism, thus sustaining white racial dominance. 
Following the events of April 1992, “black-Korean conflict” dominated 
the popular discussion on interracial dystopia in the contemporary city.53 
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So omnipresent was the narrative of conflict that it seemed to boil over into 
unexpected locations: even in municipalities where Asian American and black 
interactions were few and far between (and where the Asian American small 
entrepreneurial class was scarce), there emerged reports of increased racial 
tensions between these groups.54 
But by all accounts New Orleans East was spared this conflict. Since the 
initial resettlement of Vietnamese Americans to New Orleans, they have never 
been overrepresented as small business owners poised to take advantage of a 
black customer base. And black residents were certainly not overrepresented 
as the jobless or the working poor who, deprived of their own ethnic capital, 
were compelled to spend at immigrant-owned businesses. In fact, during the 
early years of refugee resettlement, the opposite was often true. Tran recalls his 
childhood years, when the newly arrived refugees families—the vast majority 
of whom were receiving public assistance— shopped primarily at black-owned 
grocery stores in New Orleans East. These businesses were the only ones that 
accepted food stamps, according to Tran. As the years wore on, some Vietnam-
ese refugees would eventually accumulate the capital to purchase their own 
small businesses—primarily small groceries, lunch counters, and gas stations. 
And, as it happened, they would often purchase these businesses from black 
owners who had done well for themselves over the years. This is exactly how 
Tran and his brothers acquired their butcher shop and grocery store. The 
transfer of business ownership from black to Vietnamese American points 
to the complexity of the economic relationship between the groups. On the 
one hand, it raises the problem of ephemeral black community ownership. 
Indeed, what are the barriers that would prevent such transfers from occurring 
between black business owners and black workers? But on the other hand, that 
Vietnamese Americans were purchasing from black owners rooted in the black 
community—as opposed to whites who have historically controlled retail busi-
ness in black communities—worked to subdue narratives of racial antagonism 
where the new immigrant is portrayed as the proxy to white proprietorship. 
In other words, in New Orleans, Vietnamese Americans were not so easily 
enlisted as stand-ins for “the man.” 55 All told, these sales did not occur at a 
scale that would produce sharp class disparities so that poor blacks were now 
compelled to buy their goods from Vietnamese American shopkeepers. Instead, 
the working class, and primarily the working poor, have constituted majorities 
in both communities. Through the 1990s, both groups demonstrated similar 
poverty rates in New Orleans East: 35 percent among blacks, 31 percent 
among Vietnamese Americans—both well above the 18 percent average for 
all of New Orleans.56
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New Orleans was never incorporated into what is known as the “new South.” 
While cities such as Houston, Atlanta, and Charlottesville became destinations 
for industries abandoning the rust belt, New Orleans did not attract similar 
businesses that could in turn streamline new opportunities for the upwardly 
mobile while eliminating some of the city’s older niche economies. Stagna-
tion meant that many workers would remain in a diverse range of industries 
that have sustained New Orleans for decades: tourism and hospitality, light 
manufacturing, and fishing. That so many in New Orleans have subsisted in 
working poverty leaves one to question whether or not black and Vietnamese 
American workers have directly competed for a finite number of jobs. This is 
certainly an issue evoked in other major U.S. cities where the long-standing 
black proletariat is said to be losing ground to a wave of new immigrant laborers. 
But according to economists James R. Elliot and Marcel Ionescu, this has not 
been the case in New Orleans and other cities of the deep south triad: Biloxi, 
Mississippi, and Mobile, Alabama.57 Here again, the lack of economic growth 
in the region accounts for this difference. Because these cities have failed to 
attract new industries, they have also failed to draw new waves of immigra-
tion over the past thirty years—decades that saw unprecedented numbers of 
immigrant arrivals to other major southern cities. According to 2000 Census 
data, the foreign-born population in Alabama was only 2 percent; in Louisiana, 
2.6 percent; and in Mississippi, 1.4 percent. Given these numbers, competi-
tion between so-called native blacks and new immigrants has remained largely 
irrelevant in those areas. With the exception of a steady stream of Honduran 
refugees over the course of the twentieth century, the Vietnamese refugee 
resettlement to New Orleans East could easily be described as the city’s lone 
new immigration event. 
Finally, economic stagnation and the concomitant persistence of an older, 
diversified economy have resulted in the spreading out of black and Vietnamese 
American workers across multiple industries. Thus, they have avoided direct 
competition with one another, according to Elliot and Ionescu. This is true even 
within industries in which one group has historically shown a strong concentra-
tion. Blacks who dominate the low-wage hospitality industry have seen little 
encroachment from Vietnamese Americans. And Vietnamese Americans who 
developed a large niche in the regional fishing industry—particularly as gulf 
coast shrimpers and crabbers—did not compete directly with the relatively small 
number of black commercial fishing boats in the area. By contrast, Vietnamese 
American shrimpers would become the targets of racial violence directed at 
them by white fishermen. Whites resented the competition of Vietnamese 
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Americans, who proved not only skilled at the trade, but who tended to work 
longer hours than whites while drawing on the labor of numerous family mem-
bers (wives, children, and extended clan) to boost production and corner their 
share of the market. Along the Louisiana and Texas Gulf Coast, particularly in 
Galveston Bay, Vietnamese American–owned boats were routinely vandalized 
or destroyed by arson. Several Vietnamese American operators even reported 
coming under sniper fire. In the Galveston Bay, the situation escalated when the 
Ku Klux Klan joined in support of white residents who were organizing protests 
against the Vietnamese American shrimpers. The Klan acted as a militia that 
would disrupt Vietnamese American business through sheer intimidation. It 
was ultimately undone by a federal lawsuit filed by the Southern Poverty Law 
Center, arguing that its actions not only violated the civil rights of Vietnamese 
Americans, but also the state’s arcane antitrust laws.
In New Orleans, racial violence against Vietnamese American shrimp-
ers never reached the level of intensity witnessed along the Texas coast. The 
archdiocese would serve as a mitigating political force against white groups 
attempting to organize against the Vietnamese Americans. Still, the situation 
sent a clear message to the residents of Versailles that though they did not live 
in proximity of whites, the specter of white racism was ever present. Moreover, 
Ron Chisom recalls that the racism directed at the Vietnamese American fish-
ermen was not without precedent. According to Chisom, during the 1970s, 
white shrimpers in Louisiana had also attempted to create barriers for black 
fishermen by adopting boat regulations that would disproportionately affect 
black-owned boats, most of which were antiquated compared to those of 
their white counterparts. As blacks witnessed the racial animosity directed at 
Vietnamese Americans during the 1980s, it was clear to them that white rac-
ism drew no subtle distinctions between those it sought to exclude from the 
trade. Whereas white dominance through triangulation relies on the separa-
tion of Asian Americans and blacks—often by valorizing the former over the 
latter—the racial and economic conditions along the gulf coast did not always 
conform to that process. 
None of this is to say that prior to Katrina, New Orleans East was a por-
trait of race and class harmony. Recall Myron Angel’s earlier observation that 
the relationships were at best tolerant, but certainly never allied. Some recall 
that during the very first years of resettlement there were certain tensions, as 
Catholic Charities began resettling refugees to Versailles without notifying local 
black residents of their pending arrival. Since those initial years, however, the 
history between both communities has remained rather unremarkable. Few 
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can recall an episode in which Vietnamese Americans and blacks ever made 
headlines together—for better or for worse. 
Perhaps the most accurate gauge of daily interactions between both racial 
groups is its youth who, prior to Katrina, attended high schools that were 
almost exclusively black and Vietnamese American. According to VAYLA-
NO director Minh Nguyen, the historical relationship between both sets of 
teens could also be described as tolerant: some became friends, but most did 
not. In the months following the storm, VAYLA would emerge as the only 
youth development program in the area. Minh proposed that the organization 
open its ranks to anybody from the neighborhood who desired to join, and 
soon several black teens would become members. When I asked Minh about 
the process that led to this decision, he claims that it was all rather seamless. 
“There was not much debate one way or the other,” he said. “We just decided 
it needed to be done.” 
Among the VAYLA members, hip-hop and Vietnamese pop music are 
embraced in equal measure. There is even a core group of Vietnamese Ameri-
can teens that considers itself the group’s resident emcees. During one of my 
conversations with these young men and others, I questioned whether the 
overwhelming presence of hip-hop music and vernacular among Vietnamese 
American teens is a reflection of their desire to adopt forms of blackness. The 
group neither fully agreed nor disagreed with my presumption. In a moment 
of self-reflection, one young man conceded that though he may come across 
as culturally black, he has never consciously crossed any boundaries. In New 
Orleans East, hip-hop was simply the most available genre. A young woman 
in the group affirms his observation by commenting on the provinciality of the 
self-appointed emcees: “These guys have never been outside of Versailles.” 
Mike Tran is jokingly referred to in Versailles as “neighborhood superstar,” a 
dubious distinction he earned for driving flashy sports cars, but also for having 
never moved on to a more prosperous area, despite having years ago acquired 
the means to do so. Tran explains this choice with doses of self-deprecation 
and cliché: “I guess I’m just a strange guy. I always felt more comfortable in 
the ’hood,” he said. 
Even as a businessman, Tran breaks with convention. In the summer of 
2007, a year after rebuilding his store, he decided that he was no longer going 
to work every day. The rehabilitation process had exhausted him, and now 
that the business was running smoothly again, he would place daily operations 
in the hands of his staff, particularly his manager, Cheryl, a thirty-year-old 
African American woman.58 Other store owners, including family members, 
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were critical of his decision, claiming that he was certain to lose money if he 
did not directly manage the shop. And although nobody questioned his choice 
of manager, Tran is sure that it raised some eyebrows. “All I can say is that I’m 
lucky to have her,” Tran asserted. He eschews the notion that hiring coethnics 
is always the safer, more reliable choice. “Vietnamese folks will burn you, too,” 
he said. Along these lines, he describes how the rotating credit system popular 
among many Asian immigrant entrepreneurs has unraveled in recent years. 
Instead of borrowing from banks, immigrants have maintained a practice of 
pooling their money together, each taking a rotating turn at using the pooled 
funds as a loan.59 The system is predicated on trust and an ineluctable sense of 
ethnic solidarity, but according to Tran there have been far too many instances 
in which a member of the credit circle has absconded with the funds. It so 
happens that even his mother recently lost money this way—to her cousin. 
The rest of Tran’s employees at King’s Meat Market & Grocery include 
butchers Darryl and John, who are both African American and have years of 
local experience in the trade. Their apprentice is Hai, a twenty-five-year-old 
Vietnamese American from Houston who speaks with a heavy Texan drawl. 
In 2007, Hai was released from a Louisiana State Prison, where he had been 
serving a four-year sentence for couriering drugs between Houston and New 
Orleans. As a condition of his parole, he was required to find work immedi-
ately. Tran learned about Hai’s situation through a mutual friend; before long, 
Hai was working at the store. Among the group at King’s, Hai is known for 
researching the meat specials at competing groceries and then coming up with 
even better ones. “He’s working hard. Everybody here loves him,” said Tran.
One gets the distinct impression that the scene at King’s is New Orleans as 
Tran envisions it, one in which Vietnamese Americans and blacks subsist across 
a set of nuanced relationships. Here they all appear together in the truest sense, 
each with full complexity. And though such class complexity, on its own, does 
not make for multiracial alliances, it does clear a path for it. That is, it serves 
as yet another condition of possibility, enabling solidarity in moments of crisis 
and scarcity. It does this by staying the discursive and structural forces that 
uphold hegemonic power by creating divisions among racialized groups. If, in 
the post-1992 Los Angeles context, the evocation of “Asian storeowner in the 
black ghetto” yields a distinct semiotics of race—one of mistrust, exploitation, 
and miscommunication—then New Orleans East offers a different kind of 
racial common sense. Here, Vietnamese Americans and blacks are allowed to 
carry on as all communities should: without a presupposed cloud of mistrust 
or a premature sense of racial solidarity. This was the New Orleans that Tran 
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became familiar with while growing up in Versailles, the one that seemed 
unrecognizable immediately after the storm, but soon found a way to return 
and be rebuilt. 
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